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2Abstract. In contrary to previous literature, we show in the Grossman-Stiglitz
model of noisy rational expectation that the social value of asymmetric infor-
mation can be improved with more informative prices when being informed is
uncertain. Investors always benefit from a privately payoff-relevant information,
but they have to pay more to increase the probability of observing the informa-
tion. In equilibrium, this trade-off can lead to high-risk, high return investments.
Consequently the marginal expected utility gain from observing the information
is not completely washed out by the cost of information acquisition, which leads
to Pareto-optimal equilibrium and improves investors’ welfare.
Key words: Social value of asymmetric information, information uncertainty, risk
premium, efficiency, welfare.
JEL Classification: D82, G12, G14
31. Introduction
In exchange economics with costly information, it is well recognized that the more
information prices convey, the worse off everybody can be. Therefore, public infor-
mation has no social value; this is the so-called Hirschleifer effect.1 Essentially,
reducing the cost of private information makes more investors to be informed. This
improves price efficiency on the one hand and leads to low-risk/low return invest-
ments on the other hand, which then reduce investor welfare. Is this always the
case when information is more complex and uncertain? This paper introduces infor-
mation uncertainty into a noisy rational expectation equilibrium model to answer
this question. We find that, when investors pay to reduce the uncertainty to be
informed, improving price efficiency can be socially valuable. Intuitively, the indi-
vidual investor is always better off with the information. Facing the uncertainty to
be informed, to benefit from acquiring information, investors pay more to increase
the probability to be informed. This trade-off can lead to high-risk/high-return
investments, improving investor welfare. This paper explores when such investors’
welfare improvements are likely to arise.
The role of information on financial markets, in particular the effect of public
information on price efficiency has been studied extensively. In summary, the liter-
ature shows that, the more (public) information is available to investors, the more
informative the price is and the thinner is the space to make profits. This hurts
investors’ perception, thus diminishing exposures and risk sharing. More recently,
the debate on social welfare of public information has involved mandatory financial
disclosure, questioning the salvific role of disclosure itself (see Kurlat and Veldkamp
(2015), Gargano, Rossi and Wermers (2017) and Goldstein and Yang (2017)). If,
from one hand, information improves price efficiency, its consequences on social
welfare are still debated. After the pioneering works by Allen (1984) and Laffont
1The name follows after Hirshleifer (1978) where the role of information in the framework
of technological uncertainty is discussed. Franklin Allen has been the first to acknowledge the
implications of this effect for financial markets, especially in the context of exchange economies
(see Allen (1984)).
4(1985), in a recent contribution, Angeletos and Pavan (2007) have posed again the
question about the efficient use of information and the social value of information.
Security prices reflect available information about future payoffs, while uncer-
tainty about the payoffs in different dimensions can affect security prices differently.
Uncertainty about multi-national or complex firms can be very different from the
uncertainty of firms from particular industries. Even firms from the same industries
can be exposed to multiple dimensions of uncertainty, such as cash flows, technolog-
ical innovations, and firms idiosyncratic developments differently. Recent empirical
evidence shows the revolution in information technology over the last 50 years has
increased the price efficiency for the S&P 500 firms but indeed decreased for the av-
erage public firms (Bai, Philippon and Savov (2016)). With increasing uncertainty
on multi-dimensional information in financial markets,2 it seems heroic to assume
that investors are certain to be fully informed for a predetermined fixed cost. We,
instead, assume that traders pay to increase their probability of being correctly in-
formed. Put differently, we can think about an information market where investors
can have access to different sources of information of different quality: the higher
is the quality, the higher is the probability of being informed. However, there is a
cost/disutility effect: investors pay more to increase the probability to be informed.
Such a trade-off between cost and benefit of uncertain information plays a central
role in traders’ decision making and can have important implications to market
efficiency and social welfare.
With information uncertainty, this paper examines such trade-off in an other-
wise standard Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) model of noisy rational expectation
equilibrium (NREE). The results partially confirm the Hirschleifer effect and its
implications; making effort to be informed typically improves market efficiency but
at the cost of reducing social welfare. However, in contrast with the majority of
the aforementioned literature on the social role of information, we demonstrate that
2The role of multi-dimensional and complex information markets has been widely discussed
in recent literature. Among the others, Zhang (2006) discusses information uncertainty and its
role in shaping prices; Veldkamp (2006) considers different information providers with different
prices/quality. In Gorban, Obizhaeva and Wang (2018) authors assume the presence of high and
low quality signals and uncertainty about the number of high quality informed agents.
5when the information acquisition process is probabilistic and the cost of information
is increasing and convex in the cost or effort to be informed, the trade-off can lead
to high-risk, high return investments. Consequently the marginal expected utility
gain from observing the information is not completely washed out by the cost of
information acquisition, which leads to Pareto-optimal equilibrium and improves
investors’ welfare. Therefore there is possibility of detecting an increase of market
quality associated with a beneficial increase in social welfare.
When information is imperfect and costly in a competitive economy, Grossman
and Stiglitz (1980) show that information efficiency of a price system depends on the
proportion of individuals who are informed. The more individuals choose to be in-
formed, the more efficient the price becomes, the less valuable the information is, and
the less incentive individuals choose to be informed. Therefore in equilibrium, “the
number of individuals who are informed is itself an endogenous variable” and the
price becomes more informative when there are more informed traders. Concerning
the welfare, informed trading always improves (marginal) welfare in the sense that
an individual is always better-off for being informed rather uninformed, however in
aggregate more informed trading always reduces the welfare for both informed and
uninformed traders. In particular, the social welfare is always higher when traders
are all uninformed than when they are all informed. Put differently, we detect a sort
of Prisoner’s dilemma situation.3 The social welfare would be better off if nobody
is informed. However, the single individual is rationally driven to being informed,
at least with some positive probability. Therefore, in the equilibrium, the market
may end up into a sub-optimal equilibrium (from the welfare viewpoint) typical of
a coordination-failure situation.
Regarding the endogenous information production, we endogenize traders’ deci-
sion on their optimal effort to become informed when facing information uncer-
tainty. We model a continuum of agents playing an information game inspired by
global games (Morris and Shin (2002)). Differently from classical global games, the
3In Kurlat and Veldkamp (2015), a similar situation in which the economy would be better off
if nobody is informed, is discussed but they focus on financial market anomalies in information
disclosure. For a recent review about the implications of information disclosure in terms of market
quality and welfare, we refer the reader to Goldstein and Yang (2017).
6strategy of the players is expressed in terms of the probability of being informed.
With this respect, our model resembles some recent literature on probabilistic choice
models (Mattsson and Weibull (2002)) and classical results in information theory
(Hobson (1969)). In Mattsson and Weibull (2002), an individual optimally makes
an effort to deviate from the status-quo (a reference probability) and change the
likelihood of a finite set of possible scenarios in order to get closer to implement-
ing a more desired outcome. Given that the reward is always higher for informed
than uninformed, traders choose their optimal information acquisition strategy to
maximize the trade-off between a higher expected reward of being more informed
and a higher cost. When individuals set an optimal trade-off between the expected
reward and the cost of deviating from the status-quo, Mattsson and Weibull (2002)
show that the disutility of the optimal effort is related to the information entropy.
We rephrase this game-theoretic setting as a monetary reduction of wealth due to
the investment in the information acquisition. Eventually, we model a two-stage
optimization scheme based, firstly, on a strategic information game and, secondly,
on a classical mean and variance investment decision problem. We characterize a
unique Nash equilibrium in the vector of probabilities of traders being informed
and a NREE in asset pricing. With the cost of information being increasing and
convex, we show that traders’ optimal effort depends on their risk aversion and the
information structure. The resulting endogenous information equilibrium leads to
outcomes that are significantly different from the Grossman-Stiglitz model.
In the Grossman-Stiglitz model, traders can decide to pay a fixed cost to be-
coming informed for sure. When information is complex and multi-dimensional,
being informed becomes per se an uncertain process. The more they pay for the
information, the more likely they will discover the right signal. As in the Grossman-
Stiglitz model, in equilibrium, the proportion of investors to be informed is deter-
mined endogenously and the price becomes more informative when there are more
informed traders. However, different from the Grossman-Stiglitz model, the cost is
not fixed, but contingent on market proportion of investors to be informed them-
selves. The optimal cost or effort for investors to becoming informed depends on
investors’ risk aversion and market information structure. Intuitively, more informed
7trading reduces dividend risk but increases information risk for uninformed traders,
which dominates the dividend risk. This effect becomes more significant when price
becomes less informative, the supply is less noisy, or traders are less risk averse,
generating a hump-shaped risk premium relation to the informed trading. This
hump-shaped risk premium in informed trading then provides high return, high risk
investments, which improve investors’ welfare. Therefore, differently from the pre-
vious studies about the market implications of the Hirschleifer effect in exchange
economies, we show that there are situations in which market efficiency can be
improved without harming social welfare.
The structure of the paper is as follows. We first introduce the model and traders’
optimization problem and then characterize the equilibrium in Section 2. In Section
3, we conduct a welfare analysis, together with risk premia and price efficiency.
Section 4 extends the analysis to explicitly model trading motives as a possible
route to endogenous supply. Section 5 concludes and all the proofs are collected in
the Appendix.
2. The Model
We consider the Grossman-Stiglitz model as our baseline model.4 There is a
continuum of homogenous traders, indexed by i ∈ (0, 1), who are price-takers and
can invest in two assets; a risk-free asset with a gross rate of return R > 1 and a
risky asset which pays a random dividend D˜ at the end of the period. As in the
Grossman-Stiglitzmodel, the dividend is given by
D˜ = d+ θ˜ + ˜, (2.1)
where θ˜ ∼ N (0, vθ) and ˜ ∼ N (0, v), respectively, and d = E[D] (> R) is a constant.
Different from the Grossman-Stiglitz model in which θ˜ is fully observable at a fixed
cost c, we assume that θ˜ can only be observed with a probability of p at an increasing
and convex cost of c(p) in general. To have the most intuitive expressions, we present
4In the last decades, several generalizations to a dynamic setting of the classical Grossman-
Stiglitzmodel have been proposed. Among the others, Wang (1993), Veldkamp (2006), Kyle,
Obizhaeva and Wang (2017). For the sake of simplicity, we prefer to stick with the standard static
one-period model.
8our main results for a quadratic cost function c(p) = p2 for p ∈ [0, 1].5 That is, p
is the probability of becoming fully informed about the private information θ˜ and a
trader observes it after paying the cost c(p). This implies that traders need to pay
more in order to increase their probability to be informed. Note that if traders can
only choose p = 0 or p = 1, we are back to the Grossman-Stiglitz model in which
traders are either informed (with p = 1) or uninformed (with p = 0).
The risk-free asset is in zero net supply and the risky asset has a noisy net supply
of z˜ ∼ N (0, vz). Note that the supply shock z˜ can be due to liquidity demand or
noise trading.6 The random variables θ˜, ˜ and z˜ are independent of each other.
Traders are risk averse with a CARA utility function, i.e., u(W˜i) = −e−αW˜i , where
α is the absolute risk aversion and W˜i is trader i’s terminal wealth. Let xi be the
number of shares trader i holds and P˜ be the price of the risky asset, then trader
i’s terminal wealth becomes
W˜i = xi(D˜ −RP˜ ) +Wi,0R, (2.2)
where Wi,0 is trader i’s initial wealth. We assume traders’ initial wealth is zero.
Therefore, their trading motive is purely speculative; they make profit by supplying
liquidity to the noise/liquidity traders.
2.1. Information Uncertainty and Trading. There are three dates, t = 0, 1, 2.
At date t = 0, each trader-i chooses strategically pi and pays the cost µc(pi), where
µ is a scalar measuring the sensitivity to the cost. We refer to this stage as the
information game. Next, at date t = 1, a Boolean random variable ω˜i is drawn
independently for each trader i with P(ω˜i = 1) = pi and P(ω˜i = 0) = 1 − pi. If
ω˜i = 1, the trader observes θ˜ and becomes informed (type I). If ω˜i = 0, the trader
does not observe θ˜ and stays uninformed (type U). Then, the value of θ˜ is realized
and each trader, depending on his type, chooses his optimal demand x∗i (P ) in the
risky asset, where P is the price of the risky asset. Finally, at date t = 2, with the
5We have also considered other cost functions that are increasing and convex in p. In general,
we can also assume that p ∈ [p0, 1) and c(p0) = 0, where p0 ∈ [0, 1) is a reference or status quo
probability of becoming informed. For simplicity, we assume p0 = 0 in this paper.
6In Section 4, we model the behaviour of liquidity/noise traders explicitly using endowment
shocks. For now we simply take the noisy supply as given.
9noise demand z˜, the market equilibrium price P˜ is determined by market clearing,
each trader gets their allocation of shares according to their optimal demand and
the equilibrium price. Then, the dividend D˜ is paid and consumption occurs.
2.2. Information Acquisition and Trading Decisions. Concerning the trading
decision, since dividend payoff is normally distributed (and the information cost c
does not depend on the investment strategy), the standard solution for trader i’s
optimal holding of the risky asset is given by
x∗i =
E[D˜ −RP˜ |Fi]
αVar[D˜ −RP˜ |Fi]
, (2.3)
where Fi is the information set for trader i.
Regarding the information acquisition, by taking into account the associated cost,
trader i’s objective at date t = 0 is to choose his probability pi of being informed to
maximize
U(pi;λ) = [piVI(λ) + (1− pi)VU(λ)] eαµ c(pi), (2.4)
where
λ =
∫ 1
0
ωi di =
∫ 1
0
pidi
is the market fraction of informed traders, which we will use as a state variable, and
VI(λ) = maxxi E
{
E
[
u
(
xi(D˜ − P )
) ∣∣∣FI]} , FI = {θ, P},
VU(λ) = maxxi E
{
E
[
u
(
xi(D˜ − P )
) ∣∣∣FU]} , FU = {P},
are the expected utilities of the informed and uninformed, respectively. Note that
VI(λ) and VU(λ) depend on λ since the equilibrium price P itself depends on λ.
Therefore, when needed, we will denote the price as Pλ.
7 Also, we assume traders
take λ as given, or more precisely, each trader conjectures the average choice of pi
by all other traders before giving his best response in a non-cooperative strategic
game.8 Two technical lemmas are now stated; the first provides the solution to
traders’ optimal portfolio and information acquisition decisions given the market
fraction λ. This result is based on a first order condition argument. The second
7More precisely, in equilibrium, Pλ = hλ(θ˜, z˜) is a random variable, where hλ is a deterministic
function depending on λ.
8Being λ a function of p = (pi)i∈[0,1], the problem of finding an optimal vector p∗ results in a
non-cooperative strategic game.
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lemma provides a concavity (second order) condition ensuring that the optimization
problem is well-defined. For convenience, we denote by
γ(λ) = 1− VI(λ)
VU(λ)
(2.5)
the relative benefit of informed to uninformed. We also introduce the following
notations, vx ≡ Var[x˜], σx,y ≡ Cov[x˜, y˜], βx,y ≡ σx,y/vx and ρx,y ≡ σx,y/√vxvy,
for any two normally distributed random variables x˜ and y˜. Following the NREE
literature (Admati (1985), Admati and Pfleiderer (1987)), we postulate a linear price
P˜ =
1
R
(d+ bθθ˜ − bz z˜), (2.6)
where bθ and bz are two positive coefficients to be determined in equilibrium.
Lemma 2.1. Assume traders’ expected utility is concave in pi, i.e., U ′′(pi;λ)(=
∂2U(pi;λ)/∂p2i ) < 0 and the equilibrium price P has the form of (2.6). Then
(i) trader i’s optimal demand in the risky asset is given by
x∗i (P ) =
 d+θ−RPαv , ωi = 1;d−RP
αvU
, ωi = 0,
(2.7)
where, conditional on his type k ∈ {I, U},
vU ≡ v + vθ|P
1− βP,θ , vθ|P ≡ (1− ρ
2
θ,P )vθ, βP,θ =
σθ,P
vP
;
(ii) the expected utilities of trader i, conditional on his type k ∈ {I, U}, is given
by
Vk(λ) = − 1√
1 + ξk(λ)
, ξk(λ) ≡ vχk
vD|Fk
, (2.8)
where
ξI(λ) =
(1− b2θ)2vθ + b2zvz
v
, ξU(λ) =
(1− βθ,P )(b2θvθ + b2zvz)
vU
,
and χk ≡ E[D˜ −RP˜ |Fk] is the conditional risk premium;
(iii) trader i’s optimal choice of probability to be informed is given by
p∗i = g
−1
(
1
αµ
γ(λ)
1− λγ(λ)
)
, (2.9)
where g(pi) ≡ c′(pi).
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When trader’s optimization problem is well-defined, (2.7) gives the optimal de-
mand, (2.8) defines the value function to be informed and uninformed, while (2.9)
provides the optimal probability choice.
Lemma 2.2. The function U(pi;λ) as defined in (2.4) is concave in pi if and only
if
γ(λ)
g(λ)
[
2g(λ)
1− piγ(λ) −
g(pi)
1− λγ(λ)
]
≤ g
′(pi)
g(pi)
, for all pi ∈ [0, 1]. (2.10)
A sufficient condition for U ′′(pi;λ) < 0, λ ∈ [0, 1], is given by
γ(λ) <
1
2
min
pi∈[0,1]
(
1
g(pi)
g′(pi)
+ pi
2
)
; (2.11)
moreover, if c(pi) = p
2
i , (2.11) reduces to
γ(λ) <
1
3
. (2.12)
Some remarks are needed. First, note that, as soon as one of the concavity
conditions in Lemma 2.2 is met, the optimal probability p∗i in (2.9) is the same for
all agents. In this sense, similarly to the Grossman-Stiglitz model, the cost c(p∗i ) paid
for acquiring the signal is the same for all agents, although endogenously computed.
Having said that, our traders’ optimization problem differs significantly from that
of the Grossman-Stiglitz model, which has the following solution,
p∗i =
 0, γ(λ) < 1− e−αc;1, γ(λ) > 1− e−αc, (2.13)
where c is a fixed cost. Note that γ(λ) measures the relative benefit of informed to
uninformed. Therefore, Grossman-Stiglitz model’s information equilibrium requires
γ(λ) = 1 − e−αc or equivalently VI(λ)eαc = VU(λ). In other words, the expected
utility of the informed after the cost exactly matches the expected utility of the
uninformed. As a results, traders are indifferent between becoming informed or
staying uninformed. In our model, due to the information uncertainty, the cost is
associated with the average expected utility of being informed (with probability pi)
and uninformed (with probability 1− pi), characterized in (2.4).
As said, the optimization scheme of information acquisition and portfolio choice
for trader i can be separated in two stages and solved backwards. At date 1, trader
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i decides his portfolio choice x∗i given his type, i.e., the realization of ωi. This stage
amounts to determining VI and VU . At date 0, agents play the information game:
by averaging on the likelihood of being informed and forming an expectation about
other traders’ actions, traders strategically set optimal strategies, p∗ = (p∗i )i∈(0,1).
Finally, to close the model, the equilibrium price P of the risky asset is determined
by the market clearing condition as in the standard noisy rational expectation equi-
librium.
2.3. Information and Asset Market Equilibria. Before characterizing the in-
formation and asset market equilibria, we first introduce the following definition.
Definition 2.1. We say that probability p∗ = (p∗i )i∈(0,1), market fraction of informed
λ∗, and price P ∗ of the risky asset are in equilibrium if
(i) p∗ = (p∗i )i∈(0,1) is a Nash equilibrium, meaning that for every i ∈ (0, 1),
U(p∗i ;λ) ≥ U(pi;λ) for all pi ∈ [0, 1];
(ii) the following consistency equation is satisfied9
λ∗ = E
[∫ 1
0
ω∗i di
]
=
∫ 1
0
p∗i di, (2.14)
here ω∗i is the random variable associated to the optimal probability p
∗
i ;
(iii) the price P ∗ = Pλ∗ satisfies market clearing condition∫ 1
0
x∗i (P ) di = z˜, (2.15)
where x∗(P ) = (x∗i (P ))i∈(0,1) is the optimal investment strategy profile.
We now characterize the equilibrium in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.3. Assume (2.10) holds and denote by
n =
vθ
v
, ξ0 = α
2vzvD, ξ1 = α
2vzv,
the informativeness of the private signal, and the expected trading profit when no
traders are informed and when all traders are informed, respectively. Then
9At the equilibrium, expectations realize so that the fraction of informed, λ, exactly matches
the value expected by the traders when using the revealed vector of probabilities p∗.
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(i) the equilibrium market fraction of informed traders, λ∗, is determined by
λ∗ = λ satisfying
λ = g−1
(
1
αµ
γ(λ)
1− λγ(λ)
)
; (2.16)
(ii) the linear equilibrium price of the risky asset is given by
P˜ =
1
R
(d+ bθθ˜ − bz z˜), (2.17)
where
bθ =
λv¯
v
, bz = αv¯, (2.18)
and
1
v¯
=
λ
v
+
1− λ
vU
, vU = vD +
1
α
(
vθ
vz
)(
λ
αv
)
= vD
(
1 +
nλ
αξ0
)
. (2.19)
As argued before, under the mild concavity conditions of Lemma 2.2, equilibrium
probabilities p∗i , i ∈ [0, 1], all collapse to the same value p∗ solving (2.9); more-
over, by virtue of (2.14), we have λ∗ = p∗.10 Note that, in the Grossman-Stiglitz
model, although the asset market equilibrium is identical to ours, the information
equilibrium differs significantly. Instead of (2.16), Grossman-Stiglitz model requires
γ(λ) = 1−e−ac, which means that the expected utility of the informed traders, after
having paid the cost c, is exactly the same as that of the uninformed traders (who do
not pay any cost). Differently in our model, every trader optimally chooses to pay
a cost equal to µc(p∗i ) = µc(λ
∗) in equilibrium, and p∗i = λ
∗ becomes the (optimal)
probability of observing the signal θ˜. As we will see in Section 4, this difference from
the Grossman-Stiglitz model leads to very different welfare implications.
2.4. Existence and Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium. We now examine the
existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium with respect to parameter µ, which
measures the cost sensitivity. Intuitively, λ → 0 in equilibrium as µ → ∞; λ = 1
when µ is small enough; otherwise λ ∈ (0, 1). This is demonstrated as following.
10We stress the fact that, in principle, there could be multiple equilibira in λ for the fixed point
argument (2.16) even if the optimization problem is well-defined in p∗. In the following we provide
sufficient conditions for uniqueness to keep this paper more focused on welfare analysis and market
implications. We leave this intriguing discussion on multiple equilibira for future research.
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Proposition 2.4. Assume (2.10) holds and c(p) = p2. Then
(i) λ∗ = 0 as µ→∞;
(ii) λ∗ = 1 when µ ≤ µ¯ := 1
2α
γ1
1−γ1 , where γ1 ≡ γ(1) = 1−
√
n+ξ1
n+ξ0
;
(iii) λ∗ ∈ (0, 1) when µ > µ¯; furthermore the Nash equilibrium is unique under
condition (2.12).
Moreover, the equilibrium price P ∗, satisfying (2.17), is characterized by parameters
bθ and bz defined in (2.18) and (2.19), evaluated at the equilibrium λ
∗.
Proposition 2.4 provides a necessary and sufficient condition (on the parameter
µ) for thee existence of a non-trivial Nash equilibrium 0 < λ∗ < 1 and a sufficient
condition (on the relative benefit γ) for the uniqueness. In general, the equilibrium
fraction of informed traders is expected to increase as traders become less sensitive
to the cost function. Put differently, we expect λ∗ to be decreasing in µ. However,
it turns out that monotonicity is not guaranteed.
Proposition 2.5. The equilibrium λ = λ(µ) is decreasing in µ if and only if
Γ′(λ)
Γ(λ)
≤ g
′(λ)
g(λ)
, Γ(λ) =
γ(λ)
1− λγ(λ) ; (2.20)
or equivalently
γ2(λ) + γ′(λ)
1− λγ(λ) ≤
g′(λ)
g(λ)
. (2.21)
In particular, for c(p) = p2, condition (2.21) becomes
λ[γ2(λ) + γ(λ) + γ′(λ)] ≤ 1. (2.22)
In particular, at λ = 0, condition (2.22) is always satisfied; while at λ = 1, condition
(2.22) becomes √
ξ1 + n
ξ0 + n
[
1 +
ξ1 + n
ξ0 + n
]
≤ 3ξ1 + n
ξ0 + n
+
n2ξ1
[ξ0 + n]2
. (2.23)
Proposition 2.5 provides conditions for the equilibrium λ = λ(µ) to be decreasing
in µ or, put differently, it provides a less restrictive condition for the uniqueness of
the Nash equilibrium λ∗. Note that, since λ < 1 and γ′(λ) < 0, condition (2.22) is
always satisfied as soon as (2.12) is satisfied. This leads to the following theorem in
which we summarize the main results of this section.
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Theorem 2.6. Consider the optimization problem (2.4) with c(p) = p2. Suppose
that µ < µ¯ and γ(λ) < 1/3. Then, there exists a unique equilibrium (P ∗, λ∗) such
that (i) λ∗ ∈ (0, 1), solves (2.16) and is decreasing in µ; and (ii) P ∗ is given by
(2.17).
3. Welfare Analysis
In this section, we analyze traders’ welfare and examine market conditions in
which traders’ welfare increases when prices become more informative in equilibrium.
3.1. The Welfare in the Grossman-Stiglitz Model. To better understand the
welfare effect of the information uncertainty, we first review the welfare results in
the Grossman-Stiglitz model. The following lemma is helpful for our analysis.11
Lemma 3.1. The expected utilities of informed and uninformed traders are given
by, respectively,
VI(λ) = f(λ)VU(λ) = − 1√
B(λ)
and VU(λ) = − 1
f(λ)
√
B(λ)
, (3.1)
where
f(λ) =
√
ξ1 + nλ2
ξ0 + nλ2
, B(λ) = 1 +
B1(λ)
B2(λ)
,
B1(λ) = ξ1
[
ξ1n(1− λ)2 + (ξ0 + nλ)2
]
, B2(λ) =
[
(1 + nλ)ξ1 + nλ
2
]2
.
In addition, VI(λ) > VU(λ), V
′
I (λ) < 0 and V
′
U(λ) < 0 for λ ∈ [0, 1].
In the Grossman-Stiglitz model, with a fixed information cost of c, the social
welfare of market participants is defined by U∗GS(λ) = λVI(λ)eαc + (1 − λ)VU(λ).
Based on Lemma 3.1, it is straightforward to show that
U∗GS(0) = −
1√
1 + ξ0
and U∗GS(1) = −
1√
1 + ξ1
eαc. (3.2)
Note that ξ0 = ξ1(1 + n) and hence U∗GS(0) > U∗GS(1). Therefore, in terms of
welfare, traders are better off under the no-information equilibrium than under
the full-information one (even if the cost of acquiring information is zero), which
demonstrates the well-documented Prisoner’s dilemma situation in welfare.
11The results in Lemma 3.1 are based on Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Allen (1984), but
presented more explicitly for convenience of the analysis.
16
As a textbook example, consider the case where we just have two players. By
fixing all the relevant parameters equal to one (v = vθ = vz = α = 1), we obtain
VU(0.5) < VI(1) < VU(0) < VI(0.5), where λ = 0.5 accounts for the situation where
the two players choose a different action. Eventually, the normal-form game has a
payoff matrix as in Table 1. The resulting Prisoner’s dilemma illustrates a situation
in which traders fail to coordinate towards the best outcome (represented by VU(0))
and come up with a socially less preferable Nash equilibrium.
I U
I -0.70; -0.70 -0.56; -0.76
U -0.76; -0.56 -0.57; -0.57
Table 1. Two-player payoff matrix.
Furthermore, from Lemma 3.1, VI(λ) − VU(λ) > 0 for λ ∈ (0, 1); hence being
informed is always beneficial. The expected utilities of both informed and unin-
formed traders are decreasing in λ, however the difference VI(λ)−VU(λ), can either
increase or decrease in λ. In equilibrium, VI(λ)e
αc = VU(λ), hence U∗GS(λ) = VU(λ).
Therefore, as the cost of acquiring information is reduced, more traders become in-
formed, which improves price efficiency12 but reduces welfare. Hence, we obtain the
following remark:13
Remark 3.2. In the Grossman-Stiglitz model, only the no-information equilibrium,
with λ = 0, is Pareto-optimal with respect to the social welfare. In fact, U∗GS(λ) <
U∗GS(0) for λ ∈ (0, 1).
3.2. The Welfare Improvement. To examine the welfare effect of information
uncertainty in equilibrium, we fist have the following equilibrium condition,
αµg(λ)V¯ (λ) = −[VI(λ)− VU(λ)],
12It is well known that, in the Grossman-Stiglitz model as in our model, price informativeness
measured by ρ2θ,P = 1/(1 +m), where m = ξ1/(nλ
2), is an increasing function of λ.
13Note that a similar result also holds for some related recent contributions on information
markets. See, for example, Kurlat and Veldkamp (2015) and Veldkamp (2006).
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where
V¯ (λ) ≡ λVI(λ) + (1− λ)VU(λ).
From Lemma 3.1, we then have
αµg(λ) = −VI(λ)− VU(λ)
V¯ (λ)
=
γ(λ)
1− λγ(λ) ,
where γ has been defined in (2.5) (and hence γ(λ) = 1 − f(λ) from Lemma 3.1).
Following (2.4), we now introduce traders’ welfare in equilibrium.
Definition 3.1. In equilibrium, the overall welfare of the (speculative) traders is
measured by
U∗(λ) ≡ U(λ;λ) = V¯ (λ)eΦ(λ), (3.3)
where
Φ(λ) ≡ c(λ)
g(λ)
γ(λ)
1− λγ(λ) =
1
2
λγ(λ)
1− λγ(λ)
represents the cost function in equilibrium.14
Based on Definition 3.1, it is straightforward to show that
U∗(0) = − 1√
1 + ξ0
and U∗(1) = − 1√
1 + ξ1
eΦ(1). (3.4)
Therefore as in the Grossman-Stiglitzmodel, in terms of welfare, traders are better
off under the no-information than under the full-information equilibria even if the
cost of acquiring information is zero.
To better understand this dilemma, note that as λ increases, price becomes more
sensitive to the signal, i.e, bθ increases. When λ = 1, we obtain that d+ θ˜ − RP˜ =
αvz˜. Therefore, the informed traders are only compensated by the risk premium
since the information they receive have been fully reflected by the equilibrium price,
i.e., bθ = 1. On the other hand, when λ = 0, which would be the outcome when
information is extremely costly, the price is uninformative since bθ = 0. Therefore,
traders are compensated by the risk premium, i.e, d − RP˜ = α(v + vz)z˜, which is
however larger than in the case of λ = 1, because traders perceive a larger dividend
risk, thus a larger price discount is required.
14This condition is satisfied exactly when (2.16) is met. With a slight abuse of notation, we
write λ in place of λ∗.
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As in the Grossman-Stiglitz model, prices become more efficient as traders be-
come less sensitive to the cost (to reduce the information uncertainty). However,
differently from the Grossman-Stiglitz model, we show that, in contrast to Remark
3.2, traders’ welfare can be improved as the prices become more efficient. In partic-
ular, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the welfare to be increasing
in the fraction of informed traders, i.e., (U∗)′(λ) ≥ 0.
First, it follows from Lemma 3.1 that V¯ (λ) and hence U∗(λ) can be written as
V¯ (λ) = [1− λγ(λ)]VU(λ), U∗(λ) = [1− λγ(λ)]VU(λ)eΦ(λ). (3.5)
Note that 0 < γ(λ) < 1 and hence 0 < 1 − λγ(λ) < 1 for λ ∈ (0, 1]. Relatively
to the expected utility to be uninformed, (3.5) shows two opposite effects of the
information uncertainty on traders’ welfare: a positive effect on the information
benefit,15 defined as (1 − λγ(λ))−1, and a negative effect on the cost component
eΦ(λ) (to reduce the information uncertainty). With the cost function c(p) = p2, we
have Φ(λ) =
[
(1− λγ(λ))−1 − 1]/2; therefore the negative cost effect increases in
the information benefit. The welfare improves when the positive effect overwhelms
the negative one.
Proposition 3.3. In equilibrium,
(i) traders are better off than an (fictitious) uninformed trader, who does not pay
any cost to acquire private information, i.e. U∗(λ) ≥ VU(λ) for λ ∈ (0, 1) if
and only if
eΦ(λ) ≤ 1
1− λγ(λ) ; (3.6)
(ii) traders’ welfare is better than the welfare in the no-information equilibrium
λ = 0 (where all traders make no effort to reduce the information uncer-
tainty), i.e., U∗(λ) ≥ VU(0), if and only if
VU(λ)
VU(0)
eΦ(λ) ≤ 1
1− λγ(λ) ; (3.7)
15Since VU (λ) < 0, the benefit is actually reflected by the reciprocal of 1− λγ(λ).
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(iii) traders’ welfare is improving in the fraction of informed traders, i.e., (U∗)′(λ) ≥
0, if and only if
V ′U(λ)
VU(λ)
≤ 1
2
[1− 2λγ(λ)][γ + λγ′(λ)]
[1− λγ(λ)]2 ; (3.8)
In particular, at λ = 0, (U∗)′(0) ≥ 0 if and only if
V ′U(0)
VU(0)
=
nξ0
1 + ξ0
≤ 1
2
γ(0) =
1
2
(
1− 1√
1 + n
)
; (3.9)
Proposition 3.3 (i) and (ii) show that traders’ welfare are better off than that of the
Grossman-Stiglitzmodel when the positive effect of information benefit dominates
the cost effect for all λ ∈ [0, 1]; in particular, than the welfare in the no-information
equilibrium λ = 0 when the dominance becomes stronger (note that VU(λ)/VU(0) ≥
1). The reason being that they can strategically choose the probability p∗i = λ
to observe θ˜ so that the welfare gain is not completely washed out by the cost of
information.
More importantly, Proposition 3.3 (iii) shows that price efficiency can actually
improve traders’ welfare if the reduction in the expected utility of the uninformed
traders due to an increase in λ is below a certain threshold, which depends on the
welfare difference between the informed and uninformed, i.e., γ(λ), and its derivative.
Let γ¯(λ) := 1
1−λγ(λ) represent the information benefit effect. Condition (3.8) can be
written as
V ′U (λ)
VU (λ)
≤ γ¯′(λ)[ 1
γ¯(λ)
− 1
2
]
, or equivalently,
V ′U(λ)
VU(λ)
+
1
2
Φ′(λ) ≤ γ¯
′(λ)
γ¯(λ)
,
meaning that, in equilibrium lambda, the marginal welfare cost due to an increment
in the fraction of informed traders is less than the marginal welfare gain due to an in-
crement in the probability of becoming informed.16 In particular, the no-information
equilibrium is not necessarily the best-case scenario (as in the Grossman-Stiglitz
model). More specifically, if condition (3.9) is satisfied, there exist a λˆ > 0 such
that U∗(λˆ) > U∗(0) = VU(0) for λ ∈ [0, λˆ).
The intuition is as follows. There are two opposing effects on the welfare when
the fraction of informed traders increases and price becomes more informative. The
16In equilibrium the fraction of informed is the same as the probability of becoming informed,
though the interpretation of λ is different.
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first is the (negative) Hirshleifer effect : revealing private information reduces pay-
off uncertainty, which distorts risk-sharing between the informed and uninformed
traders. Put differently, they jointly make less trading profit from the noise de-
mand z˜. In the limiting case as v → 0, their trading profit approaches zero. The
second (positive) effect comes from the increased probability to observe the private
signal θ˜, thus being able to place demands x∗i (P ) that are more positively correlated
with the payoff D˜. Essentially, (3.8) shows the condition under which the second
effect dominates the first, which results in a welfare improvement. At λ = 0, this
dominance occurs when the squared Sharpe ratio ξ0 = α
2vzvD is relatively small,
while the information advantage of the informed over the uninformed traders, γ(0),
is relatively large.
The above intuition is illustrated by Panels (A) and (C) in Fig. 3.1. Panel (C)
plots the equilibrium welfare functions for four values of the informativeness of the
private signal n. From which, we have the following two observations. First, the
initial welfare improvement from the no-information equilibrium increases as the
informativeness n increases, leading to a more hump-shaped welfare function and
a more significant welfare improvement for lower equilibrium λ. Second, there is a
strictly positive Pareto-optimal equilibrium λ∗ on the welfare improvement so that
U∗(λ∗) ≥ U∗(λ) for all λ ∈ [0, 1]. In addition, the Pareto-optimal equilibrium λ∗
decreases in n, meaning that the Pareto-optimal equilibrium can only be achieved
at a lower fraction of informed traders when the information become more informa-
tive. Panel (A) plots the regions Ω(λ) for the welfare improvement with the given
equilibrium λ and (U∗)′(λ) = 0 on the boundaries. It shows that the parameter
region in (n, vD) shrinks in λ, satisfying Ω(λ1) ⊂ Ω(λ2) for λ1 > λ2. Clearly, when
(U∗)′(0) > 0, we have (U∗)(λ) ≥ (U∗)(0) for λ ∈ [0, λ¯) with some λ¯ > λ∗. Pan-
els in Fig. 3.2 demonstrate that the region for (U∗)(λ) ≥ (U∗)(0) is larger than
the region for (U∗)′(0) > 0 for different values of λ. Therefore, different from the
Grossman-Stiglitz model, traders’ welfare is better than that in the no-information
equilibrium for 0 < λλ¯. More importantly, for 0 ≤ λ ≤ λ∗, traders’ welfare can be
improved as the prices become more efficient, resulting a positive relation between
price efficiency and social welfare.
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Figure 3.1. Panels A and B show that regions marked by
{n, vD} in which (U∗)′(λ) > 0 and v¯′(λ) > 0, respectively, for λ ∈
{0, 0.05, 0.10, 0.15, 0.20}. Panels C and D show U∗(λ) and v¯(λ) for 0 ≤
λ ≤ 1, where vD = 0.05 and n is chosen such that (U∗)′(λ∗) = 0 with
λ∗ ∈ {0.10, 0.15, 0.20} and n ∈ {0.386, 0.144, 0.020}. We set α = 1 and
vz = 1.
To better understand the underlying mechanism, we next try to relate traders’
welfare improvement to the behaviour of risk premium as a function of the state
variable.
3.3. Relationship between Welfare Improvement and Risk Premium. In
this subsection, we try to draw a connection between the condition for the im-
provement of traders’ welfare and the expected liquidity cost of the noise demand,
E
[
−z˜P˜
]
= (αv¯)vz, which is the product of the risk premium αv¯ and the variance
of the noise demand. It can be seen from Equation (2.18) in Proposition 2.3 that
v¯ is not necessarily decreasing in the fraction of the informed traders λ. Similarly,
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Figure 3.2. Regions characterized by {vD, n} for λ ∈
{0.05, 0.10, 0.15, 0.20}, where (U∗)′(λ) > 0, (U∗(λ) > U∗(0), v¯′(λ) > 0
and v¯ > αvD. We set α = 1 and vz = 1.
the total risk faced by the uninformed traders can be larger than the unconditional
variance of the dividend payoff, i.e., vU ≥ vD.
Intuitively, a larger proportion of informed traders reduces payoff uncertainty,
however it also increases adverse selection risk for the uninformed traders so that
they trade less aggressively knowing that price contains private information. There-
fore, the aggregate risk can increase in λ if the adverse selection risk plays the most
prominent role. The next corollary pins down the conditions for this to occur and
also its connection with welfare improvement.
Corollary 3.4. On the aggregate risk v¯ (per unit of supply, that is 1
z
∂E[D˜−RP˜ |z˜=z]
∂λ
):
(i) when ξ0 > 1, it decreases in λ;
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(ii) when ξ0 ≤ 1, it increases in λ if and only if
λ ≤ λ¯ = 1
n
[√
ξ1(n+ ξ0)− ξ0
]
;
(iii) when the aggregate risk v¯ is decreasing in λ, traders’ welfare U∗(λ) is also
decreasing at λ = 0, i.e., (U∗)′(0) < 0.
Corollary 3.4 shows that, close to the no-information equilibrium λ = 0, more
informed trading improves both risk premium and traders’ welfare only if the ex-
pected trading profit ξ0 ≤ 1. Intuitively, when the expected trading profit is large,
the welfare of the uninformed traders decrease at a faster rate, as shown by Equation
(3.9), although this can be offset by a relatively small n (signal informativeness),
a small n also reduces γ(0) (welfare gain by observing the private signal). There-
fore, an initial welfare improvement from the no-information equilibrium is always
accompanied by an increase in risk premium and expected liquidity cost. Note that
the converse is not true, i.e., an increase in risk premium is not a sufficient condition
for welfare improvement at the no-information equilibrium.
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 illustrate the above results numerically. Panel (D) in Fig. 3.1
plots the equilibrium risk premium v¯(λ) for the four values of the informativeness
n, showing the exact same pattern as the welfare to the informativeness of the
information. Together with Panel (C) in Fig. 3.1, it shows a positive connection
between social welfare and the risk premium. Panel (B) in Fig. 3.1 plots the regions
for the risk premium improvement for the given equilibrium λ with v¯′(λ) = 0 on the
boundaries. It shows that the parameter region for the risk premium improvement
shrinks in λ. In addition, comparing Panels (A) and (B) in 3.1, for the given λ, the
parameter region for the welfare improvement is always a subset of the parameter
region for the risk premium improvement. This implies a positive connection from
social welfare to the riks premium. This illustrates the risk premium channel to the
welfare improvement, but not otherwise, as shown in Corollary 3.4. This mechanism
channel becomes even more clearly in Figures 3.2, showing that, for given equilibrium
λ, the parameter region for v¯ > αvD is the largest, followed by the regions for
v¯′(λ) > 0, (U∗)(λ) > (U∗)(0), and (U∗)′(λ) > 0 as subsequent subsets. Therefore,
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the improvement in social welfare comes from high return, high risk investments,
which however not sufficient for better social welfare.
4. Modelling Trading Motives Explicitly
In this section, rather assuming noise in supply, we follow Bond and Garc´ıa (2017)
explicitly to motivate trading using endowment shocks.
Each trader i receives an endowment, eiD˜, at the end of the trading period. Thus,
trader i’s terminal wealth is given by17
W˜i = (xi + ei)(D˜ − P˜ ) + eiP˜ . (4.1)
We assume that ei is known to trader i, but not known to other traders. Moreover
ei = z˜+ u˜i, where z˜ ∼ N (0, vz) is an aggregate endowment shock and u˜i ∼ N (0, vu)
is an idiosyncratic shock, thus ve ≡ Var[e˜i] = vz + vu.
4.1. Optimization problem. As before, each trader i’s objective is to determine
the optimal probability p∗i of observing the private signal θ, in order to maximize
his expected utility of terminal wealth,
U(pi;λ, ei) ≡ [piVI(λ, ei) + (1− pi)VU(λ, ei)] eαµ c(pi), (4.2)
where
VI(λ, ei) = max
xi
E
{
E
[
u(W˜i)|θ, P, ei
]
|ei
}
,
VU(λ, ei) = max
xi
E
{
E
[
u(W˜i)|P, ei
]
|ei
}
are trader i’s expected utility depending on whether or not he observes the private
signal θ. Note that apart from θ, trader i also has a another private signal, which is
his own endowment shock ei. Intuitively, ei helps trader i to forecast the aggregate
endowment shock z˜, which is negatively correlated with the equilibrium price P˜ . For
example, after observing the same price, a trader who receives a positive endowment
shock will infer a larger value for θ than a trader who receives a negative endowment
shock.
17For simplicity, we assume the the payoff of the risk-free asset, R = 1.
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Conditional on his information set, trader i’s optimal portfolio is given by
x∗i (Fi) =
E
[
D˜ − P˜ |Fi
]
αVar
[
D˜ − P˜ |Fi
] − ei, (4.3)
where the information set Fi = {θ, P, ei} if trader i is informed and Fi = {P, ei} if
he is uninformed. As before, we conjecture a linear equilibrium price,
P˜ = d+ bθθ˜ − bz z˜. (4.4)
Next, we characterize the solution to traders’ optimization problem. The optimal
demand for the uninformed and informed traders are given by
x∗i (P, ei) =
(1− κ)(d− P )− κβe,P ei
αvU
− ei, (4.5)
where
κ =
σθ,P
vP − σ
2
e,P
ve
, and vU = (v + vθ)
(
1− ρ
2
P,D
1− ρ2e,P
)
= vD − κσθ,P ,
and
x∗i (θ, P, ei) =
d+ θ − P
αv
− ei, (4.6)
respectively.
Next, we compute expected utilities for the informed and uninformed traders,
i.e., VI(λ, ei) and VU(λ, ei). Next, we work out . First, trader i’s welfare given his
information set is given by
E
[
u(W˜i)|Fi
]
= − exp
{
−αeiP − 1
2
χ2i
vi
}
, (4.7)
where χi ≡ E
[
D˜ − P˜ |Fi
]
and vi ≡ Var
[
D˜ − P˜ |Fi
]
. Since, conditional on the
investor i’s endowment shock ei, the price P and expected excess return χi follow a
bivariate normal distribution, we can obtain the following expression for trader i’s
welfare given his own endowment shock.
Proposition 4.1.
E
{
E
[
u(W˜i)|Fi
]
|ei
}
= − exp
{
−A0ei + 1
2
A1e
2
i
}(
ν
vi
)−1/2
, (4.8)
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where
A0 = α d, A1 =
α2(vP |e(v + vθ)− σ2θ,P )− β2e,P − 2α(v + vθ − σθ,P )βe,P
ν
and
ν ≡ vχi + vi = vP |e + (v + vθ)− 2σθ,P , vP |e ≡ Var
[
P˜ |ei
]
= vP −
σ2e,P
vz + vu
.
From Proposition 4.1, the expected utility gain of becoming informed is indepen-
dent of his endowment shock ei, i.e.,
γ(λ) ≡ VI(ei;λ)− VU(ei;λ)−VU(ei;λ) = 1−
√
v
vD − κσθ,P . (4.9)
Therefore, the solution to trader i’s optimization problem in (4.2) is given by (2.9)
just as in the baseline model. Also, the concavity condition, U ′′(pi;λ, ei) < 0, is
satisfied if (2.12) is true, where γ(λ) is given by (4.9).
4.2. Equilibrium. Since we assume the risky asset is in zero net supply, market
clearing requires ∫ 1
0
[λx∗i (θ, P, ei) + (1− λ)x∗i (P, ei)] di = 0, (4.10)
where λ is the fraction of informed traders. In the next proposition, we determine
the coefficient bθ and bz in equilibrium.
Proposition 4.2. For given λ ∈ (0, 1), let Ψ ≡ vz/(vz + vu), there exists a linear
equilibrium price of the risky asset,
P˜ = d+ bθθ˜ − bz z˜, (4.11)
where x ≡ bθ
bz
solves
x =
1
αv
(
λ+
1− λ
Ψ−1 + x−2(v−1 + v
−1
θ )vu
)
, (4.12)
bθ =
1
1 + x−2 v
−1
θ +λv
−1

v−1u +v−1z
+
λ
v+λvθ
v+vθ
+ x2 v
−1
u +v
−1
z
v−1 +v−1θ
, (4.13)
and λ is the solution of
λ = g−1
(
1
αµ
γ(λ)
1− λγ(λ)
)
, (4.14)
where γ(λ) is given by (4.9), assuming the sufficient condition for concavity in (2.12)
is satisfied for the equilibrium λ.
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4.3. Welfare. The welfare of trader i, given his endowment shock, ei can be mea-
sured by
U∗(λ; ei) ≡ U(λ;λ, ei), αµ = 1
2
γ(λ)
λ (1− λγ(λ)) , (4.15)
since every trader optimally choose the same probability p∗i = λ in the Nash equi-
librium.
Next, we consider two special cases where λ = 0 and λ = 1. Note that for λ = 0,
the equilibrium price becomes P˜ = d−α(vθ +v)z˜ and trader i’s optimal portfolio is
x∗i (P, ei) =
d−P
α(vθ+v)
− ei. On the other hand, when λ = 1, the equilibrium price and
trader i’s optimal portfolio are given by P˜ = d+θ˜−αvz˜ and x∗i (θ, P, ei) = d+θ−Pαv −ei.
The following proposition characterizes traders’ overall welfare.
Corollary 4.3. The welfare of trader i is characterized by Equation (4.8), where
A1 =
α2(v + vθ)
(
2vz/ve − (vz/ve)2 + α2(v + vθ)vz|e
)
1 + α2vz|e(v + vθ)
,
ν
vi
= 1 + α2(v + vθ)vz|e
(4.16)
when λ = 0 with µ→∞, and
A1 =
α2v
(
2vz/ve − (vz/ve)2 + α2vvz|e
)
1 + α2vz|ev
+ α2vθ,
ν
vi
= 1 + α2vvz|e (4.17)
when λ = 1 with vz|e ≡ Var [z˜|ei] = (v−1z + v−1u )−1 and αµ = 12 γ(1)1−γ(1) .
Moreover, traders are always better off in the no-information equilibrium than in
the full-information equilibrium, i.e.,
U∗(0; ei)
U∗(1; ei) = exp
{
−1
2
γ(1)
1− γ(1) −
1
2
α2
(
vu
ve
ei
)2
vθ
}√
1 + α2vvz|e
1 + α2(v + vθ)vz|e
≤ 1.
(4.18)
Corollary 4.3 shows that, in terms of welfare, the no-information equilibrium (no
traders observe θ˜) dominates the full-information equilibrium (all traders observe θ˜),
since welfare improves for every trader when λ switches from zero to one, regardless
of the realization of endowment shocks. In other words, the full-information equi-
librium is not Pareto efficient, in the sense that there exists an equilibrium with a
different λ such that no traders are worse off and at least one trader’s welfare im-
proves. Therefore, an important question is whether the no-information equilibrium
also dominates any other equilibrium with λ ∈ (0, 1). If so, one may conclude that
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(at least in this particular model setting), the social value of asymmetric information
is strictly negative, and traders can be made better off if no one observes θ˜, e.g. by
increasing the cost parameter µ. However, in the following we show (numerically)
that this is not the case.
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Figure 4.1. Panels A and B show that regions marked by {n, vD}
in which U∗(∆; e) > U∗(0; e), where e = 0 and √vu/vz ∈ {∞, 3, 2.5, 2}
in Panels A, and e/
√
ve ∈ {0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3} and
√
vu/vz = 3 in Panels B.
Panels C and D show the welfare improvement U∗(∆; e)− U∗(0; e), where
n = 0.1. Also, we set α = 1 and vz = 1.
In Figure 4.1, it is clear that the welfare improvement region shrinks in vu and
e. Also the λ∗ for which U ′(λ∗; e) = 0 increases with vu but decreases with e.
Therefore, there exists λ close to zero such that the welfare improves for traders
with small endowment shocks, i.e., e relatively close to zero. Therefore, equilibria
with asymmetric information can be Pareto efficient, since it is not dominated by
the no-information equilibrium.
29
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we model traders’ strategic choice of the probability to observe a
costly private signal that helps to reduce uncertainty of the future payoff in an oth-
erwise standard noisy rational expectation model of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980).
We find that, in contrary to prior literature, paying a cost to increase the probabil-
ity of becoming informed can be beneficial to speculative traders who are supplying
liquidity to either noise traders (with exogenously given liquidity needs) or hedgers
who trade to insure against future endowment risk. Due to high-risk, high return
investments, the marginal expected utility gain from observing the information is
not completely washed out by the cost of information acquisition. Therefore, with
information uncertainty, the social value of asymmetric information is not strictly
negative as suggested by previous literature. Consequently, an increase of market
quality can be associated with a beneficial increase in social welfare.
Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2.1: Since traders’ terminal wealth W˜i = xi(D˜ − P˜ ) is normally dis-
tributed, given his type, trader i’s optimal demand is given by
x∗i (P ) =
E
[
D˜ −RP˜ |Fi
]
αVar
[
D˜ − P˜ |Fi
] . (A.1)
For the informed trader who observes θ and P ,
E
[
D˜ −RP˜ |θ, P
]
= d+ θ −RP, Var
[
D˜ − P˜ |θ, P
]
= v. (A.2)
On the other hand, for the uninformed trader who only observes P ,
E
[
D˜ −RP˜ |P
]
= (1− βP,θ)(d−RP ), Var
[
D˜ − P˜ |P
]
= vθ(1− ρ2θ,P ). (A.3)
Substituting (A.2) and (A.3) into (A.1) leads to (2.7).
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Next, we compute trader i’s expected utility given their information set Fi, which yields
E
[
u(W˜i)|Fi
]
= − exp
{
−α
(
E
[
W˜i|Fi
]
− 1
2
αVar
[
W˜i|Fi
])}
= − exp
−α
x∗i E [D˜ −RP˜ |Fi]︸ ︷︷ ︸
χi
−1
2
α(x∗i )
2Var
[
D˜ −RP˜ |Fi
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
vD|Fi


= − exp
{
−1
2
χ2i
vD|Fi
}
. (A.4)
For the informed, vD|FI = v and vχI = Var [(1− bθ)θ − bzz] = (1− bθ)2vθ + b2zvz, whereas
for the uninformed trader, vD|FU = vD|P = v + (1 − ρ2θ,P )vθ = v + (1 − βP,θbθ)vθ and
vχU = Var[(1− βP,θ)(d−RP )] = Var[(1− βP,θ)(−bθθ + bzz)] = (1− βP,θ)2(b2θvθ + b2zvz).
Next, since the conditional expectation χi = E
[
D˜ −RP˜ |Fi
]
itself is a normally dis-
tributed random variable for both informed and uninformed traders, we can use following
standard result to compute trader i’s unconditional expected utility.
Lemma A.1. Let X ∈ Rn be a normally distributed random vector with mean µ and
variance-covariance matrix Σ. Let b ∈ Rn be a given vector, and A ∈ Rn×n a symmetric
matrix. If I − 2ΣA is positive definite, then E [exp{b>X +X>AX}] is well defined, and
given by
E
[
exp{b>X +X>AX}
]
=|I − 2ΣA|−1/2 exp{b>µ+ µ>Σµ
+
1
2
(b+ 2Aµ)>(I − 2ΣA)−1Σ(b+ 2Aµ)}.
Applying Lemma A.1 to the conditional expected utility in (A.4) with X = χi, A =
−12(vD|Fi)−1, Σ = vχi , b = 0, µ = 0 leads to the desired result and the expressions for
ξI(λ) and ξU (λ) in (2.8).
Thus, assuming the concavity condition U ′′(pi, λ) is satisfied, trader i’s optimal choice
of pi is determined by the first order condition,
αµg(p∗i ) = −
VI(λ)− VU (λ)
λVI(λ) + (1− λ)VU (λ) =
γ(λ)
1− λγ(λ) ,
which leads to (2.9).
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Proof of Proposition 2.3: We substitute the linear equilibrium price P = 1R [d+ bθθ˜ − bz z˜]
into traders’ optimal demand functions in (2.7), from which we obtain
x∗I(θ, P ) =
d+ θ −RP
αv
and x∗U (P ) =
(
1− bθvθ
b2θvθ+b
2
zvz
)
(d−RP )
α
(
v +
b2zvz
b2θvθ+b
2
zvz
vθ
) . (A.5)
Then, by applying the market clearing condition,
λx∗I(θ, P ) + (1− λ)x∗U (P ) = z˜,
we obtain the following equilibrium price,
P˜ =
1
R

λ
v
(d+ θ˜) +
(1−λ)
(
1− bθvθ
b2
θ
vθ+b
2
zvz
)
v+
b2zvz
b2
θ
vθ+b
2
zvz
vθ
d− αz˜
λ
v
+
(1−λ)
(
1− bθvθ
b2
θ
vθ+b
2
zvz
)
v+
b2zvz
b2
θ
vθ+b
2
zvz
vθ

=
1
R
(
d+
λv¯
v
θ˜ − αv¯z˜
)
, (A.6)
where
1
v¯
=
λ
v
+
(1− λ)
(
1− bθvθ
b2θvθ+b
2
zvz
)
v +
b2zvz
b2θvθ+b
2
zvz
vθ
.
Thus, by matching coefficient to the conjectured equilibrium price, we obtain
bθ =
λv¯
v
and bz = αv¯.
Since bθ = λbz/(αv), we obtain an explicit solution for v¯ by solving
λ
v
+
(1− λ)
(
1− (λbz/α) vθ/v
(λbz/α)2vθ/v2+b
2
zvz
)
v +
b2zvz
(λbz/α)2vθ/v2+b
2
zvz
vθ
=
bz
α
for bz and substituting the solution back into the expression for 1/v¯.
On the optimization problem in (2.4), let V¯ (λ) ≡ λVI(λ) + (1− λ)VU (λ) and V¯ (p;λ) ≡
pVI(λ) + (1− p)VU (λ), we have18
U ′(p;λ) = eαµc(p)[αµg(p)V¯ (p, λ) + [VI(λ)− VU (λ)]]
U ′′(p;λ) = αµg(p)eαµc(p)
[(
αµg(p) +
g′(p)
g(p)
)
V¯ (p, λ) + 2[VI(λ)− VU (λ)]
]
.
Therefore the necessary and sufficient condition for U ′′(p;λ) ≤ 0 is(
αµg(p) +
g′(p)
g(p)
)
V¯ (p, λ) + 2[VI(λ)− VU (λ)] ≤ 0. (A.7)
18We drop the subscript i for the remainder of the proof, in order to ease the notation.
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Note that in equilibrium,
αµ = − 1
g(λ)
VI(λ)− VU (λ)
V¯ (λ)
=
1
g(λ)
γ(λ)
1− λγ(λ) .
Also, note that
V¯ (p, λ) = [1− pγ(λ)]VU (λ), VI(λ)− VU (λ) = −γ(λ)VU (λ).
Therefore in equilibrium, (A.7) becomes[
γ(λ)
1− λγ(λ)
g(p)
g(λ)
+
g′(p)
g(p)
]
(1− pγ(λ))− 2γ(λ) ≥ 0. (A.8)
We have from (A.8) that
− γ(λ)
1− λγ(λ)
g(p)
g(λ)
+
2γ(λ)
1− pγ(λ) ≤
g′(p)
g(p)
, (A.9)
which leads to condition (2.10).
Moreover, for a sufficient condition, note that (A.7) can be written as
VI(λ)− VU (λ) ≤ −1
2
[
g(p)
g(λ)
VI(λ)− VU (λ)
−V¯ (λ) +
g′(p)
g(p)
]
V¯ (p, λ), (A.10)
which can be written as[
1− 1
2
V¯ (p, λ)
V¯ (λ)
g(p)
g(λ)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤1
[VI(λ)− VU (λ)] ≤ −1
2
g′(p)
g(p)
V¯ (p, λ). (A.11)
Therefore, a sufficient condition for U ′′(p;λ) ≤ 0 is given by
VI(λ)− VU (λ) ≤ −1
2
g′(p)
g(p)
V¯ (p, λ), (A.12)
which is equivalent to [
1 +
1
2
g′(p)
g(p)
p
]
VI(λ)− VU (λ)
−VU (λ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
γ(λ)
≤ 1
2
g′(p)
g(p)
(A.13)
that simplifies to the condition (2.12).
Next, if the sufficient condition for U ′′(p;λ) ≤ 0 is satisfied, the Nash equilibrium for the
choice of probability pi to observe the private signal θ must be symmetric, since traders
are homogeneous, i.e., p∗i = λ for all i ∈ (0, 1), from which we obtain the equilibrium λ in
(2.16).
Proof of Proposition 2.4: Note that γ(λ) ∈ (0, 1). With c(p) = p2, from the equilibrium
condition 2αµλ = γ(λ)/[1− γ(λ)], it is easy to see that λ → 0 as µ → ∞. For λ = 1, we
have µ = 12α
γ(1)
1−γ(1) .
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It remains to discuss the case µ > µ¯. To this aim, note that, in case of c(p) = p2, the
fixed point (2.16) is equivalent to
λ2 − 1
γ(λ)
λ+
1
2αµ
= 0. (A.14)
By defining
F 1(λ) =
1
2γ(λ)
− 1
2γ(λ)
√
1− 2γ
2(λ)
αµ
; F 2(λ) =
1
2γ(λ)
+
1
2γ(λ)
√
1− 2γ
2(λ)
αµ
,
(A.14) can be rewritten as
[λ− F 1(λ)][λ− F 2(λ)] = 0.
Assuming µ ≥ 2γ2(λ)/α (otherwise the fixed point has no solution and λ∗ = 1), F 1 and
F 2 are well-defined. It is not difficult to show that 0 < F 1(λ) ≤ F 2(λ). Therefore, since
F 1(0) > 0, one solution to (A.14) exists if and only if F 1(1) < 1. This condition is exactly
µ > µ¯.
Finally, concerning uniqueness, note that dF 1(λ)/dλ < 0. Indeed,
dF 1(λ)
dλ
= − γ
′(λ)
2γ2(λ)
(
1−
√
1− 2γ
2(λ)
αµ
)
+
γ′(λ)
αµ
√
1− 2γ2(λ)αµ
=
γ′(λ)
γ(λ)
F 1(λ)√
1− 2γ2(λ)αµ
< 0.
Negativity is due to the fact that γ′(λ) < 0, γ(λ) > 0, and F 1(λ) > 0. By monotonicity,
λ = F 1(λ) provides at most one solution. Therefore, if a second solution λ˜ to the fixed
point exists, it must solve λ˜ = F 2(λ˜). By definition F 2(λ) > 12γ(λ) ; therefore, as soon
as γ(λ∗) < 1/3, we would have λ˜ = F 2(λ˜) > 3/2, which is unfeasible. This proves that
the solution to the fixed point is unique as soon as the sufficient condition for concavity,
γ(λ) < 1/3, is satisfied.
Proof of Proposition 2.5: In equilibrium,
αµg(λ) = −VI(λ)− VU (λ)
V¯ (λ)
=
γ(λ)
1− λγ(λ) = Γ(λ).
For λ = λ(µ), taking the derivative w.r.t. µ, we have
αg(λ) = −λ′(µ)[Γ′(λ)− g
′(λ)
g(λ)
Γ(λ)].
Therefore λ′(µ) ≤ 0 if and only if (2.20) holds.
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Applying c(p) = p2 to condition (2.20) leads to condition (2.21). Clearly, (2.21) holds
for λ = 0. For λ = 1, condition (2.21) becomes
γ21 + γ1 + γ
′
1 ≤ 1.
Since γ(λ) = 1− f(λ), this is equivalent to
1 + f21 ≤ 3f1 + f ′1.
Using the fact that f(λ) =
√
ξ1+nλ2
ξ0+nλ2
, we obtain condition (2.23).
Proof of Proposition 3.3: In equilibrium, the welfare function is given by
U∗(λ) = V¯ (λ) exp(Φ(λ)),
where
V¯ (λ) = λVI(λ) + (1− λ)VU (λ) = (1− λγ)VU (λ), Φ(λ) = c(λ)
g(λ)
γ(λ)
1− λγ(λ) .
Hence
U∗′(λ) = eΦ(λ)(−V¯ (λ))
[
V¯ ′(λ)
−V¯ (λ) − Φ
′(λ)
]
.
and U∗′(λ) ≥ 0 if and only if
V¯ ′(λ)
−V¯ (λ) ≥ Φ
′(λ),
Note that
V¯ ′(λ)
−V¯ (λ) =
V ′U (λ)
−VU (λ) +
γ(λ) + λγ′(λ)
1− λγ(λ)
and
Φ′(λ) =
γ(λ)
1− λγ(λ)
[
1− c(λ)g
′(λ)
g2(λ)
+
c(λ)
g(λ)
γ(λ)
1− λγ(λ)
]
+
c(λ)
g(λ)
γ′(λ)
(1− λγ(λ))2 .
Therefore U ′(λ) ≥ 0 if and only if
V ′U (λ)
VU (λ)
≤ γ(λ)
1− λγ(λ)
c(λ)
g(λ)
[
g′(λ)
g(λ)
− γ(λ)
1− λγ(λ)
]
+
(
λ
1− λγ(λ) −
c(λ)
g(λ)
1
(1− λγ(λ))2
)
γ′(λ).
Since c(p) = p2, it follows that
S(λ) ≡ 1
2
[
1− λγ(λ)
1− λγ(λ)
]
+
λ
2
[
2− 1
1− λγ(λ)
]
γ′(λ)
γ(λ)
=
1
2
1− 2λγ(λ)
1− λγ(λ)
[
1 + λ
γ′(λ)
γ(λ)
]
,
which leads to (3.8). At λ = 0,
V ′U (0)
VU (0)
=
nξ0
1 + ξ0
.
Applying this to condition (3.8) at λ = 0 leads to condition (3.9).
35
Proof of Corollary 3.4: The risk premium per unit of supply is given by 1zE[D˜−RP˜ |z] = αv¯.
From (2.19), we have
v
v¯
= λ+
1− λ
1 + n+ nξ1λ
.
Then
∂(v/v¯)
∂λ
=
[1 + n+ nξ1λ]
2 − [1 + n+ nξ1 ]
[1 + n+ nξ1λ]
2
. (A.15)
(i) When ξ0 > 1,
∂(1/v¯)
∂λ > 0 always holds, meaning that the risk premium v¯ decreases
in λ.
(ii) When ξ0 ≤ 1, we have ∂(1/v¯)∂λ ≤ 0 if and only if
1 + n+
n
ξ1
λ ≤
√
(1 + n) +
n
ξ1
,
which leads to the result.
(iii) When λ = 0, aggregate risk v¯ decreases in λ, i.e., v¯(0) < 0, if and only if ξ0 > 1.
Note that if ξ0 > 1, the necessary and sufficient condition for welfare improvement
in (3.9) becomes
n ≤ γ(0) = 1−
√
1
1 + n
⇒ 1− n ≥
√
1
1 + n
, (A.16)
which requires n < 1. However, when n < 1, (A.16) becomes
(1− n)2(1 + n) ≥ 1, (A.17)
which never holds since
(1− n)2(1 + n)− 1 = n[n(n− 1)− 1] < 0. (A.18)
Proof of Proposition 4.1: In the following proof, we drop the trader specific subscript,
as we will always be referring to trader i. First, note that each trader’s expected utility
conditional on his information set is given by
VK(e;λ) ≡ E
{
E
[
u(W˜ )|F
]
|e
}
= E
[
− exp
{
−αeP − 1
2
χ2
v
}
|e
]
, K ∈ {I, U},
(A.19)
where χ ≡ E[D˜ − P˜ |F ] and v ≡ Var[D˜ − P˜ |F ], respectively.
First, since (given the endowment shock e) χ and P follow a bivariate normal distribu-
tion with mean vector and covariance matrix given by
µ =
 µχ|e
µP |e
 and Σ =
 vχ|e σ(χ,P )|e
σ(χ,P )|e vP |e
 , (A.20)
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where µχ|e ≡ E[χ|e], µP |e ≡ E[P |e], vχ|e ≡ Var[χ|e], vP |e ≡ Var[P |e] and σ(χ,P )|e ≡
Cov[χ, P |e]. Thus, using Lemma A.1 we can establish the following result,
VK(e;λ) = − exp
−µ
2
χ|e + αe
[
2νµP |e + 2µχ|eσ(χ,P )|e + αe
(
σ2(χ,P )|e − νvP |e
)]
2ν

√
v
ν
,
(A.21)
where ν = v + vχ|e.
If the trader is informed (K = I), i.e., F = {θ, P, e}, since χ = d + θ − P and v = v,
we obtain that
µχ|e = −βe,P e, µP |e = d+ βe,P e,
vχ|e = vθ + vP |e − 2σθ,P , σ(χ,P )|e = σθ,P − vP |e. (A.22)
Substituting (A.22) into (A.21) leads to the expected utility of an informed trader in (4.8)
with v = v.
On the other hand, if the trader is uninformed (K = U), i.e., F = {P, e}, since χ =
(1− κ)(d− P )− κβe,P e and v = vD − κσθ,P , κ = σθ,P /vP |e, we obtain that
µχ|e = −βe,P e, µP |e = d+ βe,P e,
vχ|e = (1− κ)2vP |e, σ(χ,P )|e = −(1− κ)vP |e. (A.23)
Substituting (A.23) into (A.21) leads to the expected utility of an uninformed trader in
(4.8) with v = vD − κσθ,P .
Proof of Proposition 4.2: Substituting the optimal demands x∗(P, e) and x∗(θ, P, e) in
(4.5) and (4.6) into the market clearing condition (4.10) leads the following,
(d− P )
αv¯
+
λ
αv
θ˜ =
[
1 + (1− λ)κβe,P
αvU
]
z˜ (A.24)
where
1
v¯
≡ λ
v
+
1− λ
v˜U
, v˜U =
vU
1− κ.
Thus, the equilibrium price can be written as
P = d+
λv¯
v︸︷︷︸
bθ
θ˜ − αv¯
[
1 + (1− λ)κβe,P
αvU
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
bz
z˜. (A.25)
Therefore, we obtain
x ≡ bθ
bz
=
1
αv
λ
1 + (1− λ)κβe,PαvU
, (A.26)
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which can be written as
x =
1
αv
[
λ− (1− λ)
(
κβe,P
v
vU
)
x
]
. (A.27)
Since vU = vD − κσθ,P , κ = σθ,P /vP |e and βe,P = σe,P /ve, also
σe,P = −bzvz, σθ,P = bθvθ,
vP |e = b2θvθ + b
2
zvz|e, vz|e = (v
−1
z + v
−1
u )
−1, (A.28)
we can obtain that
−
(
κβe,P
v
vU
)
x =
vzvvθx
2
vuvzvD + vevvθx2
=
1
ve/vz + x−2vu(v−1θ + v
−1
 )
. (A.29)
Substituting (A.29) back into (A.27) leads to (4.12).
Next, given x, we substitute (A.28) into the expression for bθ and obtain that
bθ =
λv¯
v
=
λbz
(
vuvzvD + vevvθx
2
)
bzx2vzvvθ − vevvθx(1− λ) + bzvu(vvθx2 + vzvDλ) . (A.30)
Since bz = bθ/x, (A.30) can be simplified to
bθ =
vevvθx
2 + vuvzvDλ
vevvθx2 + vuvz(v + vθλ)
, (A.31)
which leads to the expression in (4.13).
Proof of Corollary 4.3: For λ = 0, since the equilibrium price P˜ = d− αvDz˜, we have
vP |e = α2v2Dvz|e, σθ,P = 0,
βe,P = −αvD vz
ve
, ν = vD(1 + α
2vDvz|e). (A.32)
Substituting (A.32) into (4.8) leads to (4.16).
On the other hand, for λ = 1, since the equilibrium price P˜ = d+ θ˜ − αvz˜, we have
vP |e = vθ + α2v2 vz|e, σθ,P = vθ,
βe,P = −αv vz
ve
, ν = v(1 + α
2vvz|e). (A.33)
Substituting (A.33) into (4.8) leads to (4.17).
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